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Trident in UK Politics
and Public Opinion
Nuclear weapons policy looks set to feature
as a political issue in the 2015 general
election. A broad consensus on UK nuclear
weapons policy since of the end of the Cold
War amongst the party leaderships of the
three main Westminster parties has been
disturbed by the debate on whether and, if
so, how to replace the current Trident
nuclear weapons system. This has been
exacerbated by a coalition
government in which the Liberal
Democrats have broken ranks
and moved towards active
consideration of a smaller,
cheaper replacement for
Trident that does not entail
continuous deployment of
nuclear weapons at sea. The
Conservative leadership remains committed
to a like-for-like replacement of the current
system in line with the policy adopted by the
Blair government in its 2006 White Paper on
The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear
Deterrent. Labour policy remains unclear. An
internal debate on whether to stick with the
policy adopted in 2006 or move closer
towards a Liberal Democrat position is
underway. 
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and Paul Ingram
July 2013
The official line from the shadow defence
team is that it is awaiting publication of the
Trident Alternatives Study and the BASIC
Trident Commission report. It is highly
unlikely that any of the main Westminster
political parties will enter the next election
on manifesto commitment to complete
nuclear disarmament. The debate is further
complicated by the outcome of the
referendum on Scottish
independence in September
2014 and the implications of a
‘yes’ vote for continued basing
of Trident at the Clyde Naval
Base. 
Public opinion remains
deeply divided on nuclear
weapons and choices around Trident
replacement. Over twenty opinion polls have
been conducted since 2005 when the debate
on Trident replacement began to gather
momentum. Polls suggest that opinion has
moved towards relinquishing nuclear
weapons after Trident when given a simple
yes/no choice. This is generally strengthened
when respondents are given a cost of £20-25
billion for the capital costs of replacing
Trident starting with a new fleet of ballistic
missile submarines. 
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Opinion is split more evenly three ways
when a third option of a smaller, cheaper
replacement is introduced. Data, here,
suggest the electorate is broadly in favour of
keeping nuclear weapons in some form, but
against a like-for-like replacement of the
current system. The polls also present a
plurality of views on whether
nuclear weapons are necessary
for UK security, whether
they make the UK a safer
place to live, whether the
UK should retain nuclear
weapons as long as other
states have them, and the
circumstances under which
the UK should use its
nuclear weapons. The
electorate tends to value the
security seen to derive from continued
possession of nuclear weapons whilst
recognising the dangers of possession to
national and global security.2 It is also
reluctant to support use of nuclear weapons
even if the UK is subject to a nuclear attack.
The indeterminacy of public opinion gives
all three main Westminster parties political
space to rethink UK nuclear weapons policy
after Trident or recommit to current policy.
Polls suggest the electoral consequences of
policy change or stasis are unlikely to be
decisive. However, the polls also
demonstrate that men, those in
the older age groups and
Conservative voters are
more likely to favour
replacing Trident and are
more inclined to think
nuclear weapons make the
UK safer. Policy change to
a smaller, cheaper, ‘de-
alerted’ system or nuclear
disarmament could put some
votes at risk in these cohorts. This is
tempered by polls that demonstrate the
relatively low salience of nuclear weapons
policy in UK politics and polls that
demonstrate greater support for policy
change over stasis amongst those for whom
nuclear weapons policy is an issue that could
shape their vote.
2  House of Commons Public Administration Select
Committee, Engaging the Public in National Strategy,
HC 435 (London: HMSO, 2013), pp. 2-3.
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In a decision announced in 2006 and confirmed
by parliamentary vote in March 2007, the UK
embarked on a long, expensive and controversial
programme to replace its current Trident
nuclear weapons system, beginning with the
procurement of a new fleet of ballistic missile
submarines designed to carry its Trident missiles
and arsenal of nuclear warheads. The United
Kingdom is unusual amongst nuclear weapon
states for having a history throughout the
second half of the twentieth century
of high-profile and heated public
debate on nuclear weapons
policy, covering moral,
strategic, diplomatic,
industrial and budgetary
issues. It is widely believed
that the debate in the 1980s
had a significant impact on
the wider governance of the
country. The divisions were
deep and polarised. The cause of
nuclear disarmament has attracted
some of the country’s largest and longest
protests, which in turn have sparked a resolute
backlash among other sections of public
opinion. It had two peaks, the first 1958-63 and
the second, coinciding with the acquisition of
the original Trident system from 1980-89 and
the last years of the Cold War. This history
resonates today and current UK debate on
whether and, if so, how to replace the current
Trident system remains deeply political. 
A senior member of the previous Labour
government under Tony Blair and Gordon
Brown once remarked that winning the
intellectual debate on whether or not to replace
Trident is one thing, winning the political
debate is quite another.3
This briefing is published on the eve of the
government’s presentation to Parliament of its
own Trident Alternatives Study looking into the
pros and cons of alternative nuclear
weapon systems and postures. The
study marks a new three-year
phase in the on-going debate
that will encompass the
2015 General Election, the
subsequent Strategic
Defence and Security
Review, and culminate in
the ‘Main Gate’
procurement decision for the
new fleet of submarines
scheduled for 2016. BASIC’s
Trident Commission, with a broader
mandate and due to be published later this year,
will mark an important contribution to this
phase of the debate. This briefing examines the
contemporary politics of Trident replacement in
two parts. First, it outlines party political views
of nuclear weapons policy; and second, it
explores public opinion drawing on over 20
opinion polls conducted since 2005, including
new research commissioned for this briefing.
Introduction
3  Interview with Nick Ritchie, 2008.
The United
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UK involvement in emerging 
international movements
In recent years there has been a renaissance in
international networks to promote global
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation,
though this time the initiative has come from
mainstream politicians across the political
spectrum, senior statesmen and women and
former military leaders. Sparked by a letter in
January 2007 in the Wall Street Journal by
Senator Sam Nunn, former
Secretaries of State Henry
Kissinger and George Shultz,
and former Defense Secretary
William Perry,4 the Nuclear
Security Project and the Global
Zero Movement were created.
The Nuclear Security Project was
formed in association with the
Hoover Institution and the Nuclear
Threat Initiative in order to develop the
arguments of these four statesmen. The Global
Zero movement was established to appeal to a
wider global audience, with a series of summits,
the development of high-profile signatories, and
other forms of outreach, including a feature film
called Countdown to Zero. The case for
significant progress towards a world free of
nuclear weapons became a central plank of the
Obama administration’s foreign policy
articulated in full in a major speech on nuclear
disarmament in Prague in April 2009 and again
in Berlin in June 2013.
Senior politicians in Britain were quick to
catch up with developments in the United
States. Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett gave
a speech on 25 June 2007 at the Carnegie
International Nonproliferation Conference in
Washington D.C. on behalf of the government
endorsing the vision of a world free of nuclear
weapons and outlining initial steps the
government would take toward that end.5
Later speeches by Prime Minister Gordon
Brown expanded this agenda.6 On 30
June 2008, in an article in the
London Times entitled ‘Start
Worrying and Learn to Ditch
the Bomb’, former UK Foreign
and Defence Secretaries Sir
Malcolm Rifkind
(Conservative), Lord David
Owen (Crossbencher), Lord
Douglas Hurd (Conservative), and
Lord George Robertson (Labour)
endorsed the vision of a world free of nuclear
weapons, in the context of likely “widespread
proliferation with extremism and geopolitical
tension”.7 Sir Malcolm subsequently became the
leading British signatory to Global Zero.
Part I: Trident and party politics
4  George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and
Sam Nunn, ‘A World Free of Nuclear Weapons’, Wall
Street Journal, 4 January 2007. Available at
<http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-
digest/article/6109>. 
5  Margaret Beckett, Keynote Address: A World Free of
Nuclear Weapons?, 25 June 2007. Available at
<http://carnegieendowment.org/2007/06/25/keynote
-address-world-free-of-nuclear-weapons/e15>. 
6  Gordon Brown, speech to the Chamber of Commerce
in Delhi, India, 21 January 2008.
7  ‘Start worrying and learn to ditch the bomb’, The Times,
30 June 2008. Available at
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columni
sts/guest_contributors/article4237387.ece>. 
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Soon after this a group of British
parliamentarians formed the Top Level Group
of UK Parliamentarians for Multilateral Nuclear
Disarmament and Non-proliferation, with a
highly impressive cross-party membership of
former Foreign and Defence Secretaries, Chiefs
of Defence Staff and diplomats sitting in the
House of Commons or Lords. The group was
formed to raise awareness within Britain and
particularly within Parliament of the
importance of reducing the risk of nuclear
conflict and the need to work towards a world
free of nuclear weapons. The Convener of the
Group, Lord Browne of Ladyton, also went on
to found the European Leadership Network, a
similar group of senior pan-European political,
military and diplomatic figures that has
developed rapidly since 2010 to become the
leading network of high-level individuals
involved in the European strategic nuclear
debate. Similar leadership networks have since
been established in Asia and Latin America.
UK Party Politics
UK political parties have historically been far
from unified in their positions on nuclear
weapons policy and global nuclear disarmament
since the UK became a nuclear power, and
individual politicians have changed their
positions (in both directions) as their careers
have progressed. The polarised nature of the
debate in the 1980s was diluted by the end of
the Cold War in 1989, the decision made by the
Labour Party to abandon its policy of unilateral
nuclear disarmament after it lost the 1987
General Election (a policy adopted by its annual
conference in 1982 prior to the 1983 election),
and subsequent bilateral and unilateral
disarmament measures and force reductions by
most of the established nuclear weapon states in
response to the changed geo-political
environment. Those strongly in favour of
continued possession of nuclear weapons have
been content to see reductions in UK warheads,
delivery systems, operational deployments and
readiness, as the political salience of the nuclear
weapons issue has declined. 
The security policy establishment has been
more inclined to consider alternative nuclear
postures in the absence of immediate nuclear
threats following the demise of the Soviet
Union and Britain’s participation in a range of
post-Cold War military interventions in which
its nuclear capability has played no obvious role. 
Cross-party agreement has emerged on the
heels of the global zero initiative for Britain to
play a leading role amongst nuclear weapon
states in moving towards a world free of nuclear
weapons through multilateral disarmament.
This is the policy of the current Government
and a continuation of the policy of the previous
Labour Government. This was evident when
the issue was last fully debated by Parliament in
March 2007 when Members of Parliament and
the Lords separately considered the
Government’s White Paper of December 2006
declaring its decision to start the concept phase
for the next generation of ballistic missile
submarines to replace the current Vanguard
class, and to participate in the US life extension
programme for the Trident II D5 ballistic
missile fleet. Government ministers sought to
balance the commitment to this first phase of
Trident renewal with a further modest
reduction in warhead numbers and a concerted
diplomatic strategy to promote multilateral
nuclear disarmament. This balanced approach
has been taken forward by the coalition
government that came to power in May 2010. A
dual commitment to the logic of deterrence and
the logic of disarmament aptly characterises
Britain’s post-Cold War nuclear weapons policy
– what Colin Gray has called “running with
nuclear fox and riding with the disarmament
hounds”.8
8  Colin Gray, “An International ‘Norm’ Against Nuclear
Weapons? The British Case”, Comparative Strategy, 20:
3, 2010, p. 233.
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Conservative Policy
The Conservative Party currently maintains
strong support for a like-for-like renewal of
Trident and the maintenance of the strategy of
continuous-at-sea deterrence (CASD), as
declared in its 2010 election manifesto.9 Whilst
there are notable individuals within the Party
who have been sceptical about the need for
Britain to retain nuclear weapons, mindful of
the associated opportunity costs for other
military capabilities, such opinion represents a
small minority within the Party. In the 2007
Parliamentary debate the leadership along with
most Conservative MPs fully supported the
Labour Government’s proposals (the vote
depended upon their support). Since coming to
power the Party has continued the previous
government’s dual-strategy of Trident
replacement alongside diplomatic leadership in
encouraging multilateral disarmament.
Nevertheless, it has had to balance its support
for like-for-like replacement with its coalition
partner’s scepticism. As a result, then Defence
Secretary, Liam Fox, declared that the new
government would “maintain Britain's nuclear
deterrent” but also evaluate the current system
“to ensure value for money” and undertake a
review of alternatives to a direct like-for-like
replacement of the current Trident system.10
The government has proceeded as planned
with the ‘concept and assessment’ phase for the
successor submarine project, and took it
through MoD’s ‘Initial Gate’ spending decision
in May 2011.11 In May 2012 the government
announced £350 million of contracts for the
first 18-months of the assessment phase,12 and
in June 2012 authorised a £1.1 billion contract
for refurbishment of the Rolls Royce submarine
nuclear propulsion plant facility in Derby and
long-lead items for the production of the core
for the reactor for the seventh Astute-class boat
and the first successor-class boat.13 The
government plans to place an order for the
specialist high-grade steel for the successor
submarines in 2014 so that it is ready for
manufacture and cutting in 2016 after the main
gate decision is taken.14 Spending on the
concept phase up to initial gate was £900
million. Projected spending from initial gate in
2011 to the main gate decision in 2016 is £3
billion.15 These decisions have caused tension
between the Conservatives and Liberal
Democrats in the coalition. Deputy Prime
Minister Nick Clegg claimed in October 2012
that it was crystal clear no final decision on
Trident renewal would be taken until 2016, and
warned his coalition partners against ‘jumping
the gun’.16 Defence Secretary Philip Hammond
responded by saying that it was clear already
there were no credible alternatives that could be
cheaper.17
9  2010 Conservative Party Manifesto. Available at:
<http://www.conservatives.com/~/media/Files/Activi
st%20Centre/Press%20and%20Policy/Manifestos/Ma
nifesto2010>.
10  Conservative Party Policy Document. “What We
Stand For”. Available at
<http://www.conservatives.com/Policy/Where_we_sta
nd/Defence.aspx and Ministry of Defence “Review Into
Costs of Trident”. Available at
<http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/
DefencePolicyAndBusiness/ReviewIntoCostsOf Triden
t.htm>.
11  Ministry of Defence, “The United Kingdom’s Future
Nuclear Deterrent: The Submarine. Initial Gate
Parliamentary Report”, May 2011. Available at
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/upl
oads/attachment_data/file/27399/submarine_initial_g
ate.pdf>.
12   House of Commons, Official Report, 22 May 2012,
Col. 54WS.
13  House of Commons, Official Report, 18 June 2012.
Available at:
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm20121
3/cmhansrd/cm120618/debtext/120618-0001.htm>.
14  House of Commons, Official Report, 7 December
2011, Col. 149HW.
15  House of Commons, Official Report, 13 July 2013,
Col. 412W.
16  BBC report, ‘Trident: Nick Clegg warns against
‘jumping the gun’ on decision’, 29 October 2012.
Available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-
20116648>.
17  Richard Norton-Taylor, The Guardian, ‘Philip
Hammond fuels row with Nick Clegg on Trident’, 1
November 2012.
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One important qualification to the
Conservative front bench’s support for
replacement was the new Chancellor’s insistence
in July 2010 that the capital cost of procuring a
new generation of ballistic missile submarines
would come entirely out of the defence
budget.18 This was at a time when the
coalition’s 2010 Comprehensive Spending
Review cut MoD’s cumulative real growth by
7.5% over 2010-11 to 2014-15.19 This had
important implications for the opportunity
costs of the project and changed some views on
Trident replacement within the Ministry of
Defence. Four years earlier a Communicate
Research Poll of MPs had asked whether the
Treasury rather than the MoD should pay for
any replacement of the strategic nuclear
weapons capability. Conservative MPs were split
down the middle with 44% agreeing and 38%
disagreeing.20 Contrary to popular belief, the
costs of the original Trident programme were
also met by MoD. In July 1980, for example,
then Defence Secretary Francis Pym made a
statement to the House on the replacement of
Polaris with Trident in which he stated:
“We estimate the capital cost of a four-boat
force, at today’s prices, as up to £5 billion, spread
over 15 years. We expect rather over half of the
expenditure to fall in the 1980s. We intend to
accommodate this within the defence budget in
the normal way, alongside our other major force
improvements... the provision of the strategic
deterrent has always been part of normal
defence budgeting. 
It is a weapons system, like any other weapons
system – ships, tanks, or whatever it may be.
Within the defence budget this can and will be
accommodated in the same way as Polaris was
accommodated 10 to 20 years ago”.21
This was offset by a 3 per cent real growth in
MoD’s budget up to 1985/86 to cover some of
the cost.22 This time, however, the Trident
replacement programme cannot be supported
by an increase in the defence budget at a time of
sharp cuts in public spending.
The Conservative-led coalition not only
continued the policy of replacement, but also
recognised the responsibility to engage on the
new disarmament agenda in the international
arena. One of the first acts of the newly-
appointed Foreign Secretary, William Hague,
was to announce for the first time a limit on the
overall UK nuclear weapons stockpile of 225
warheads and a review of declaratory nuclear
policy as an important UK contribution to the
final week of the 2010 NPT Review
Conference at the UN in New York that had
been in session as the election was conducted
and the new government took power. Hague, as
Opposition Foreign Secretary, had previously
given two speeches prioritising measures to
strengthen global non-proliferation norms and
practices, and explicitly recognising the need to
show serious political commitment to
multilateral nuclear disarmament, along with a
commitment to the vision of a world free of
nuclear weapons.23 In 2008, he said:
“… Addressing the existence of stockpiles of
nuclear weapons is an integral part of efforts to
reduce the risks of nuclear weapons and a
fundamental commitment under the NPT,
which requires “negotiations in good faith on
effective measures” on nuclear disarmament and
on “a treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective
international control”.
18  G. Vina and K. Donaldson, ‘Cameron Backs Osborne
in Cabinet Split over Trident Nuclear Force Funding’,
Bloomberg 30 July 2010. Available at
<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-
30/cameron-backs-osborne-in-cabinet-split-over-
trident-nuclear-force-funding.html>.
19  HM Treasury, Spending Review 2010, Cm 7942,
(London: HMSO, October 2010), p. 10
20  Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs had been clearer in
their support for the costs to be covered by the defence
budget: 65% and 59% respectively. See
<http://www.comres.co.uk/polls/Nuclear_Deterrence.
pdf>.
21   House of Commons, Official Report, 15 July 1980,
Columns 1236- 1251.
22  House of Commons Defence Committee, Strategic
Nuclear Weapons Policy, HC 266 (London: HMSO,
1982), para. 70. 
23  See speeches by William Hague to IISS in June 2006
and July 2008. Available at
<http://www.iiss.org.uk/recent-key-addresses/william-
hague-address-jul-08/>.
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“… there needs to be strategic dialogue between
Britain, the United States, France, Russia and
China on how to achieve future reductions in
nuclear stockpiles, on ways to reduce further the
risk of nuclear confrontation or accidental
nuclear war, and how to make progress on our
disarmament commitments in a way that
strengthens the NPT.
“… Reducing the risk posed by weapons of mass
destruction and nuclear weapons in particular is
not a party political issue but a vital national
interest which needs a common purpose and
shared vision.”
The results of the declaratory policy review
and the value for money review were announced
alongside the Strategic Defence and Security
Review (SDSR) in October 2010. The SDSR
also set out further reductions in nuclear
warheads, a reduction in the missile capacity of
the next generation ballistic missile submarines,
and a decision to extend the life of the current
Vanguard-class submarines by a further four
years, thus moving the key ‘Main Gate’ spending
decision on the new submarines into the next
parliament in 2016. In sum, the Conservative
leadership has been comfortable with pursuing
the Trident replacement programme as planned
alongside additional reductions in UK nuclear
capability and a tightening of declaratory policy
along similar lines to those outlined in the
Obama administration’s Nuclear Posture
Review released in April 2010, together with a
more reluctant endorsement of a value for
money review and formal alternatives review.
Liberal Democrat Policy
The Liberal Democrat Party has always had a
strong anti-nuclear element within it but its
leadership has ensured the Party remained in
favour of Britain retaining a nuclear weapons
capability. This resolve has, however, come
under question more recently. Party leader and
future Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg
commissioned Sir Menzies Campbell in 2009 to
conduct a review of options for replacing the
current Trident system, which reported four
weeks before the election.24 Nick Clegg stated
his belief that this review provided proof of
‘credible alternatives’ to a like-for-like
replacement.25 While studiously avoiding any
explicit policy recommendations beyond the
need for further review, the study called into
question the claim from the 2006 White Paper
of the possibility of the emergence of a future
strategic threat in the next 20-25 years, the need
for a nuclear ‘insurance policy’ based on the
current Trident system,26 the necessity of a
continuous-at-sea deterrence (CASD) nuclear
posture, and a nuclear force structure still
shaped by the ‘Moscow Criterion’, and
suggested the possibility of extending the life of
the current class of Vanguard submarines.27 It
outlined possible alternatives such as the use of
dual-capable Astute submarines that could
deploy conventional as well as nuclear-armed
cruise missiles, as well as a ‘virtual’ nuclear
capability based on a disarmed system with a
residual and credible capability to reconstitute
nuclear warheads and a delivery system within a
specific timeframe should an existential military
threat to the country re-emerge.28
24  Menzies Campbell, “Policy Options for the Future of
the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Weapons”, April 2010.
Available at
<http://www.libdems.org.uk/siteFiles/resources/docs/
News/MCTrident%20Review.pdf>.
25  Quoted in Liberal Democrat Party Update. “Menzies
Campbell Launches Review of UK Nuclear Weapons”. 3
April, 2010. Available at:
<http://www.libdems.org.uk/news_detail.aspx?title=
Menzies_Campbell_launches_review_of_UK_nuclear_
weapons&pPK=691e8ca2-8766-450b-a3ce-
400f214cc641>.
26  Menzies Campbell, “Policy Options for the Future of
the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Weapons”, p. 23.
27  Ibid., p. 4.
28  Ibid., p. 5.
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Clegg decided that the Party would go into
the 2010 general election explicitly opposing a
like-for-like replacement of the Trident system
but without committing to a specific alternative
or ruling out nuclear disarmament. The Party’s
2010 manifesto outlined a strategy to cut the
deficit that included “saying no to the like-for-
like replacement of the Trident nuclear weapons
system, which could cost £100 billion. We will
hold a full defence review to establish the best
alternative for Britain’s future security”,29 clearly
leaving open the possibility relinquishing
nuclear weapons entirely. Clegg sought to use
this policy to set the Liberal Democrats
apart from the Conservative and
Labour Parties. The party
leadership also insisted that the
Trident replacement
programme be included in the
defence and security review
that all the main Westminster
parties had committed to
undertake after the election. 
Following the failure of Labour or
the Conservatives to win a majority of
seats in the 2010 election, the latter opted for a
coalition with the Liberal Democrats. This was
facilitated by a Coalition Agreement that
confirmed the coalition would proceed with the
Trident replacement programme as planned but
that “the renewal of Trident should be
scrutinised to ensure value for money. Liberal
Democrats will continue to make the case for
alternatives”.30
In May 2011 agreement was reached between
the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats that
the Government would conduct an 18-month
assessment of ‘credible alternatives’ to a like-for-
like replacement led by the Cabinet Office and
Liberal Democrat Armed Forces Minister Nick
Harvey and report to both the Prime Minister
David Cameron and Deputy Prime Minster
Nick Clegg.31 Harvey lost his post in a Cabinet
reshuffle in September 2012 following which
responsibility for the Trident Alternatives Study
was passed first to David Laws and then to
Chief Secretary to the Treasury, Danny
Alexander. Support has since grown
within the Liberal Democrats for
abandoning continuous-at-sea
deterrence, questioning the
need for a nuclear system
designed to destroy Russia’s
major cities, and considering
development of a dual-capable
Astute class submarine with
nuclear-armed cruise missiles as
the basis for a follow-on to
Trident.32 David Cameron’s view
remained that “the Liberal Democrats are
absolutely entitled to use the time between now
and 2016 to look at alternatives, from looking at
those alternatives I do not think that any of
them would give us the assurance of having a
full-service nuclear deterrent with the Trident
submarine and missile system. I do not think
the alternatives come up to scratch in anything
like the ways some of their proponents propose,
but under our coalition agreement he is free to
continue to look at that. The programme for
replacing Trident is on track and going ahead.”3329  2010 Liberal Democrat Manifesto. Available at:
<http://issuu.com/libdems/docs/manifesto?mode=em
bed&layout=http%3A%2F%2Fskin.issuu.com%2Fv%2
Flight%2Flayout.xml&showFlipBtn=true&proShowM
enu=true>.
30  The Cabinet Office, ‘The Coalition: Our Programme
for Government’, London, 20 May 2010, p. 15,
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/409088/pfg_c
oalition.pdf, date accessed 14 June 2010.
31  ‘Work on Trident nuclear renewal gets go ahead’, BBC
News Online, 18 May 2011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-13438420,
date accessed 19 May 2011. The Trident Alternatives
terms of reference can be found at
http://www.parliament.uk/deposits/depositedpapers/2
011/DEP2011-0825.zip, date accessed 14 September
2011.
32   A. Grice, “Lib Dems Push for ‘Stand-by’ Trident
Replacement Deal”, The Independent, 19 July 2012,
Available at:
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/lib-
dems-push-for-standby-trident-replacement-deal-
7956987.html>.
33   House of Commons, Official Report, 19 October
2010, Column 807.
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Labour policy
Labour briefly outlined its current policy in the
consultation document that launched its
Shadow Defence Review in February 2012: 
“While nuclear weapons exist, we cannot leave
ourselves and our children open to the threat of
nuclear blackmail. Labour remains committed
to the position set out in the 2006 White Paper
to replace the current Vanguard class
submarines and Trident missile system. We
remain committed also to our commitments
under the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty
and will work towards a world free of nuclear
weapons. This review does not specifically
consider the issue of Trident renewal, but
Labour is committed to examining the findings
of the Government’s ‘Trident Alternatives
Review’ and will also assess the findings of the
Basic Trident Commission”.34
Attitudes within the Labour Party towards
this issue are heavily influenced by a collective
interpretation of the Party’s experience in the
1980s. Many in the Party believe they lost two
general elections (1983 and 1987) because of
their policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament.
A residual fear of being seen by the electorate as
‘soft’ on defence has shaped subsequent Labour
attitudes to defence and security, including
nuclear security. In 1987 Labour leader Neil
Kinnock accepted the need to jettison the
electorally unpopular unilateral disarmament
policy in favour of negotiated, multilateral
nuclear disarmament with the other established
nuclear powers. This began a long process of
transforming the Party’s foreign and defence
policy to one in which it was seen as strong on
defence. This meant supporting Trident and
Britain’s status as a nuclear weapon power albeit
whilst pursing multilateral nuclear disarmament,
and further reductions in its nuclear arsenal.35
This was largely complete by 1997 when the
party was elected to power under Tony Blair.36
It was reflected in Labour’s 1998 Strategic
Defence Review, which stated that “while large
nuclear arsenals and risks of proliferation
remain, our minimum deterrent remains a
necessary element of our security” but that “We
will retain our nuclear deterrent with fewer
warheads to meet our twin challenges of
minimum credible deterrence backed by a firm
commitment to arms control”.37 There was
perceived to be little domestic political payoff in
being the government to renounce British
possession of nuclear weapons.
In December 2006 towards the end of Tony
Blair’s premiership his government announced
its decision to start the process of replacing the
Trident system, beginning with the procurement
of a new fleet of ballistic missile submarines.
The decision was outlined in some detail in the
White Paper on The Future of the United
Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent.38 Blair was
committed to the UK remaining a nuclear
weapon power. He stated in his memoirs
published in 2010 that, “the expense is huge,
and the utility in a post-cold war world is less in
terms of deterrence, and non-existent in terms
of military use”, and that the “common sense
and practical argument” against Trident was
strong, but abandoning nuclear weapons would
be “too big a downgrading of our status as a
nation” and in an uncertain world “too big a risk
for our defence”.39
34  Available at
<http://www.labour.org.uk/uploads/0816d8a8-a26a-
8384-bdef-ef79b07edebe.pdf>. 
35  Darren Lilleker, ‘Labour’s defence policy: from
unilateralism to strategic review’, in R Little and M.
Wickham-Jones (eds.), New Labour’s Foreign Policy: A
New Moral Crusade? (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 2000), p. 231
36  Len Stott, ‘Labour and the Bomb: The first 80 Years’,
International Affairs 82: 4, 2006, pp. 685-700.
37 Strategic Defence Review, Defence White Paper, Cm
3999 (London: Ministry of Defence, July 1998).
38  Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Foreign &
Commonwealth Office (FCO), The Future of the
United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, Cm 6994
(London: HMSO, 2006).
39  Tony Blair, A Journey (London: Random House), p.
636.
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However, the White Paper also discussed
whether CASD could be maintained with three,
rather than four, submarines given advances in
submarines and reactor technology. Later, in a
speech to the UN General Assembly in
September 2009, Prime Minister Gordon
Brown implied to some surprise that the
decision had already been taken to go down to
three boats for the new fleet.40
When Ed Miliband was elected leader of the
Party after the 2010 general election, Labour
called for Trident to be included in the Strategic
Defence and Security Review (SDSR) already
underway. He issued a statement warning that
the UK now “[needs] to look very carefully at
whether renewing Trident is the necessary or
the right thing to do".41 Eric Joyce, former
Parliamentary Private Secretary to then Defence
Secretary, Bob Ainsworth, claimed in 2010 that
Ed Miliband could be persuaded that there is no
practical reason for the renewal of Trident, and
that it would be tactically disadvantageous for
the Labour Party to enter the next election
outflanked on the issue.42 Nevertheless,
Miliband asserted in 2010 that there is a
“continuous case for Britain to retain an
independent nuclear deterrent”.43 He inherited
a 2010 election manifesto declaration that
although “a Strategic Defence Review will look
at all areas of defence…we will maintain our
nuclear deterrent. We will fight for multilateral
disarmament, working for a world free of
nuclear weapons…”.44
There is nevertheless an active debate in the
Party as to whether to replace Trident and, if so,
how. Former defence secretary and NATO
Secretary General George Robertson, for
example, is firmly in favour of a like-for-like
replacement, whilst another former defence
secretary, Des Browne, is in favour of dropping
CASD but still retaining nuclear weapons, and
former Chief Whip Nick Brown and many
backbenchers support relinquishing nuclear
weapons altogether.45 It is worth recalling that
88 Labour MPs voted against the Labour
government’s March 2007 motion to begin the
Trident replacement process and a further 30
were absent (most Liberal Democrat MPs voted
against but the government carried the motion
by 409-161 votes). Miliband confirmed at the
Party Conference in October 2012 that the
Party’s policy on Trident replacement will be
reviewed after the publication of the Trident
Alternatives Study and the BASIC Trident
Commission report stating “We need to look at
what are the arguments around the Trident
upgrade, how soon does it have to happen and
what are the alternatives, and I think that is the
right way forward”.46
40  United Nations. “Speech to General Assembly by
Prime Minister, Mr. Gordon Brown 23 September
2009”. Available at
<http://www.un.org/en/ga/64/generaldebate/pdf/GB
_en.pdf>.
41  A. Grice, “Lib Dems Push for ‘Stand-by’ Trident
Replacement Deal”, The Independent, 19 July 2012
Available at
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/lib-
dems-push-for-standby-trident-replacement-deal-
7956987.html>.
42  Speech at CND meeting on the side-lines of the 2010
Labour Conference, published in Wheeler, B., 27
September 2010. “Ed Miliband Wants Trident Rethink
– Ex-Defence Minister”. BBC. Available at:
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-11423362>.
43  Quoted in the Labour Leadership Newsletter Summer
2010. Available at: <http://labourcnd.org.uk>.
44  2010 Labour Manifesto. Available at:
<http://www2.labour.org.uk/uploads/TheLabourParty
Manifesto-2010.pdf>. (Emphasis added.)
45  John Hutton and George Robertson, “There is no
magic alternative to Trident  - Britain has got to keep it”,
Daily Telegraph, 28 February 2013; Des Browne and Ian
Kearns, “Trident is no longer key to Britain’s security”,
Daily Telegraph, 5 February 2013; Nick Brown,
“Dropping Trident will lead to a richer, safer Britain”,
The New Statesman, 21 June 2013. Available at
<http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2013/06/lab
our-needs-drop-trident-richer-safer-britain>.
46  See Northwest Evening Mail, “Work Needed on Sub
Plans”, 5 October 2012. Available at
<http://www.nwemail.co.uk/news/work-needed-on-
sub-plans-1.1002640?referrerPath=> and
defencemanagement.com that reports on Miliband’s
comments at fringe meeting available at
<http://www.defencemanagement.com/news_story.asp
?id=21058>.
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Smaller Parties
The Scottish National Party has been strongly
against Trident renewal in any form, with no
sign of divergence within the Party.47 SNP
Defence Spokesperson, Angus Robertson,
summed up the party’s position in June 2012:
“people in Scotland do not want
Trident. Church leaders, the
Scottish Trades Union
Council, the Scottish
government and Scotland's
parliament are all against
weapons of mass
destruction being in our
waters.”48 Trident and UK
nuclear weapons policy has a
strong political symbolism for
the Party and its supporters. The
SNP’s position is one of principle,
but it also reflects a tactical reality that
Scottish public opinion is against the
deployment of nuclear weapons, and that the
issue can be used as a tool to demonstrate the
‘colonial’ imposition of a policy determined by
officials in London and dependent upon the
stationing of nuclear submarines at Scottish
bases. If the SNP is successful in persuading the
Scottish electorate to vote for independence in
September 2014 (opinion polls currently favour
a ‘no’ vote), it could have significant
ramifications for the future basing of ballistic
missile submarines at Faslane and the nuclear
warhead depot at Coulport on the Clyde. 
In all likelihood this would involve protracted
negotiations over the relocation of these
facilities that could face significant budgetary
and logistical challenges. However, even with a
narrow majority no vote to independence, it is
possible that the processes involved in planning
for such contingencies could well
strengthen the hand of those in
Scotland looking to put greater
pressure on the basing of
submarines on the Clyde.
The on-going long-term
risk to the viability of bases
in Scotland would have to
be factored in by Whitehall
defence planners when
making substantial new
investments in the shore
facilities as part of the Trident
replacement programme.
Plaid Cymru also has a policy hostile to a UK
nuclear weapons capability, but its political
leverage is far more limited, except in the highly
unlikely event that Milford Haven or other
Welsh ports were considered as future
alternative bases to Faslane and Coulport. 
The Green Party is also resolutely opposed to
Britain maintaining nuclear weapons, and has
outlined its plans for the country to divest itself
of its arsenal and join the NPT as a non-nuclear
weapon state.49
The UK Independence Party is in favour of
renewing the current system. 
47   2010 Scottish National Party Manifesto. pg. 21 and
2010 Green Party Manifesto. Available at:
<http://www.greenparty.org.uk/assets/files/resources/
Manifesto_web_file.pdf>.
48  Speech published in Nicholas Watt, “Coalition Faces
Split over Trident Nuclear Replacement”, The
Guardian, 17 June 2012. Available at:
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/jun/17/coalitio
n-split-trident-nuclear-submarines-replacement> and
2010 Scottish National Party Manifesto. pg 21.
If the SNP is
successful in persuading
the Scottish electorate to vote
for independence in September
2014, it could have significant
ramifications for the future basing
of ballistic missile submarines at
Faslane and the nuclear
warhead depot at Coulport
on the Clyde.
49  See Green Party, Policies for a Sustainable Society,
PD406-410. Available at
<http://policy.greenparty.org.uk/pd>.
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Public opinion on UK nuclear weapons, or
more specifically party political perceptions of
public opinion, is central to the political debate.
This part of the report examines the data on
British public views on UK nuclear weapons
through the many opinion polls and surveys
conducted since the debate on whether or not
to replace Trident began around 2004/05,
including a new survey commissioned
by the University of York for this
research. The starting gun for
the debate was fired in the
2003 Defence White Paper
on Delivering Security in a
Changing World. The
paper announced that
“Decisions on whether to
replace Trident are not
needed this Parliament but are
likely to be required in the next
one [i.e. after the 2005 general
election]. We will therefore continue to take
appropriate steps to ensure that the range of
options for maintaining a nuclear deterrent
capability is kept open until that decision
point.”50 Preliminary work began soon after
that announcement, with then Defence
Secretary Geoff Hoon noting in July 2004 that
“Work on a range of options for maintaining a
nuclear deterrent capability is in hand”.51
The section draws on over 20 opinion polls
conducted since then. It outlines key trends and
suggests some political implications for the
three main Westminster parties. Details of each
poll are found in the Appendix including URLs
for access to primary poll data. Caveats are
required when comparing and contrasting
diverse poll data. First, identification of trends
across polls is interpretive not
statistical. Longitudinal statistical
analysis would require asking
methodologically comparable
cohorts a uniform set of
questions over time. This is
not the case with the
collection of polls examined
here. The polls ask different,
though sometimes quite
similar, questions and provide
different contexts to those
questions. The charts below give an
indication of the type of question asked but for
exact wording please refer to the primary data
accessed through the poll URLs in the
Appendix. Second, the data are recorded in
different ways. Some polls record voting
intention and gender, others do not.  Most polls
record data by age group, but the age categories
vary. Sample size varies across the polls and
some are targeted at British adults whilst others
are limited to Scottish adults. Nevertheless, the
polls do highlight a number of important
trends. 
Part 2: Trident and public opinion
50   Ministry of Defence (2003) Delivering Security in a
Changing World, Cm 6401-I (London: HMSO), p. 9.
51   House of Commons, Official Report, 19 July 2004,
Column 32W.
Public opinion 
on UK nuclear weapons, 
or more specifically party
political perceptions of public
opinion, is central to the political
debate.…There is a clear
divergence of opinion on whether
or not the UK should replace
the current Trident
system.
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1. Support for Trident replacement 
0%               20%              40%              60%
Opinion in favour of not replacing Trident
tends to increase when respondents are
presented with a recapitalisation cost of £20-
25bn. As Greenpeace’s report based on an
October 2005 poll conducted by MORI
observes: “Public support for replacing Trident
is strongly (if not completely) influenced by the
context in which the question is posed. 
If alternative uses for the money are suggested,
especially if it could be used to fund additional
public services, there is greater opposition to
financing Trident’s replacement from the public
purse.”52 Nevertheless, Lord Ashscroft’s 2013
survey of Scottish adults found little change in
support for or against Trident replacement after
cost was introduced to the survey questions.
Poll
Replace Trident/keep nuclear weapons 
Don’t replace Trident/get rid of nuclear weapons 
Don’t know
There is a clear divergence of opinion on
whether or not the UK should replace the
current Trident system. Polls suggest British
opinion may have moved from majority support
for replacing Trident to majority support
against replacement.
However a recent poll for the House of
Commons Public Administration Select
Committee suggests majority support for
replacing Trident if a cheaper alternative cannot
be found.
2005 Greenpeace: 
Replace/don’t replace Trident
2006 Daily Politics: 
Keep/don’t keep nuclear weapons
2006 Guardian: 
Replace/don’t replace Trident
2006 Times: 
Replace Trident/don’t replace/disarm now
2007 YouGov: 
Keep/don’t keep nuclear weapons
2007 Simons Foundation: 
Keep/don’t keep nuclear weapons
2009 Guardian: 
Replace/don’t replace Trident
2009 Independent: 
Replace/don’t replace Trident
2010 IoS and Sunday Mirror: 
Replace/don’t replace Trident
2013 Public Admin. Cttee: 
Replace/don’t replace Trident 
if no cheaper alternative
Support for replacing/not replacing Trident (British adults)
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2. A smaller, cheaper option
In the context of the government’s Trident
Alternatives Study, this picture is complicated
by the introduction of a third option of a
smaller, cheaper alternative to a like-for-like
replacement of the current system in three polls
of British adults: Left Foot Forward (2009),
Chatham House (2010), and Public
Administration Select Committee (2013). 
52   ‘British Attitudes to Nuclear Weapons’, survey conducted
by MORI for Greenpeace, September 2005, p. 17.
Replace Trident
Replace with cheaper / smaller
Don’t replace Trident
Don’t know
Replace Trident
Don’t replace Trident/get rid of nuclear weapons
Don’t know
0%               20%              40%              60%Poll
2005 Greenpeace (b): Replace 
or don’t replace Trident @£25B
2006 Daily Politics (b): Replacing Trident 
is easy (favour) or hard (not in favour) to justify
@£25B
2007 More4: Replace Trident or don't replace
@£20B/get rid of Trident now + UK should never
have had Trident
2009 People Magazine: Spend £20B on Trident or
spend £20B on nurses or affordable homes
2013 University of York: Replace Trident or keep
Trident but don't replace @ £25B/get rid of Trident
now
0%               20%              40%      Poll
2009 Left Foot Forward
2010 Chatham House
2013 Public Aff Ctee
Data from these polls suggest a clear majority in
favour of retaining some form of nuclear
capability but only a third to a fifth in favour of
a like-for-like replacement, particularly when
respondents are given a figure for the cost
ranging from £20-£25 billion. Interestingly, the
number of respondents registering ‘don’t know’
increases considerably when the option of a
smaller, cheaper system is introduced compared
to polls that provide a straight-forward choice
of replace or don’t replace Trident.
Support for replacing/not replacing Trident @ £20-25bn (British adults)
Support for a smaller, cheaper system (British adults)
3. Do we need 
nuclear weapons? 
Five polls asked British adults
whether the country needs
nuclear weapons and whether the
UK is more or less secure with
nuclear weapons. Polls for the
Simons Foundation (2007), Left
Foot Forward (2009), and UNA-
UK (2012) asked whether nuclear
weapons make the UK more or
less safe. A University of York
(2013) poll asked whether
nuclear weapons are still necessary
and a Public Administration
Select Committee poll (2013)
asked a range of questions about
the necessity of UK nuclear
weapons. The polls show a range
of outcomes with no clear
majority. The 2009 Left Foot
Forward poll found a third (32%)
of respondents agreeing that
nuclear weapons make the UK
safer now and will do so in future,
with two-thirds agreeing that nuclear
weapons either make no difference to UK
security or make the UK a less safe and
secure place to live. 
2007 Simons 
Foundation
2009 Left Foot Forward
(today)
2009 Left Foot Forward
(future)
2012 UNA-UK
2013 University of York
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Nuclear weapons make us safer/less safe (British adults)
Attitudes to nuclear weapons from 2013 Public Administration Select Committee Poll
Safer with nuclear weapons/necessary to have
No difference
Less safe with nuclear weapons/not necessary to have
Don’t know
0%               20%              40%       Poll
0%               20%              40%              60%Are you persuaded that...
Important UK has nuclear weapons
Nukes keep the peace
Nukes make the world more dangerous
UK would be seen as less important 
without nukes
UK does not need nukes for influence
UK nukes needed as long as others 
have them
UK nukes not relevant to today’s threats
Yes
No
Don’t know
In contrast, polls for the Simons Foundation in
2007 and University of York in 2013 found 46%
in agreement that nuclear weapons make the UK
safer and more secure – but not a majority. 
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The Public Affairs Committee poll found slim
majorities persuaded by arguments that nuclear
weapons keep the peace between industrialised
major powers (54%), that having our own
nuclear weapons is important (54%), but also
that nuclear weapons make the world more
dangerous (64%).
Support for and against use of nuclear weapons
0%               20%              40%               60%              80%Poll / questions asked
2005 Greenpeace(a)
Approve use in war against country 
with no nukes
Disapprove use in war against country
with no nukes
Don't know
2005 Greenpeace(b)
Approve use in war against country 
with nukes but has not used them
Disapprove use in war against country 
with nukes but has not used them
Don't know
2005 Greenpeace(c)
Approve use in war against country 
that uses them against us
Disapprove use in war against country 
that uses them against us
Don't know
2007 Simons
Only use in war
Use as a deterrent against attack  
Never justified
Don't know
2012 UNA-UK
Never use
Only after conventional attack
Only after nuclear attack
Only after threatened with nukes
Don't know
4. Should we use 
nuclear weapons?
Three polls asked respondents the conditions
under which they would approve the use of
nuclear weapons by the UK – Greenpeace
(2005), Simons Foundation (2007), and UNA-
UK (2012). The Greenpeace survey registered a
small majority in favour of using UK nuclear
weapons if attacked with nuclear weapons first
(53%). The Simons Foundation found 48%
against using nuclear weapons in any
circumstances. Similarly 47% of respondents in
the UNA-UK poll stated that the UK should
never use nuclear weapons, with only 22%
supporting use if the UK has been attacked with
nuclear weapons.
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5. Variance by gender, age, and voting intention
The polls demonstrate that men, those in each
poll’s older age groups (age ranges vary by
survey53) and Conservative voters are more
likely to favour replacing Trident and are more
inclined to think nuclear weapons make the UK
a safer place to live. Just under half of these poll
show a majority in favour of a like-for-like
replacement of Trident in any one of these
categories (men, older age group, Conservative
voters – notably in the Public Administration
Select Committee poll). 
0%               20%              40%               60%              80%Poll
Male
Female 
2006 Daily Politics (a): Keep nuclear
weapons
2006 Daily Politics (b): Replacing 
Trident easy to justify @£25B
2006 Guardian: Replace Trident
2006 Times: Replace Trident
2007 More4: Replace Trident @£20B
2007 YouGov: Keep nuclear weapons
2007 Simons Foundation: Keep nuclear
weapons
2009 Guardian: Replace Trident
2009 People Magazine: Spend £20B on
Trident
2009 Independent: Replace Trident
2010 IoS and Sunday Mirror: Replace
Trident
2013 University of York: Replace
Trident@£25B
2013 Public Admin. Cttee: Replace
Trident if cheaper option not available
Support for Trident replacement by gender
The same applies when respondents are
asked about a third option of a smaller,
cheaper replacement for Trident, whether
nuclear weapons make the UK more or less
safe, and whether they are necessary or
unnecessary for UK security.
53 For most polls the youngest age group is 18-24 but for some it's 18-29 or 18-34. Similarly, most polls’ oldest age
group is 65 and over but for some its 60 and over, 55 and over, or 50 and over. The charts for this section take each
poll’s oldest and youngest age group therefore results are not directly comparable across polls.
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0%               20%              40%               60%              80%Poll
2006 Daily Politics (a): Keep nuclear
weapons
2006 Daily Politics (b): Replacing Trident
is easy (favour) to justify @£25B
2006 Guardian: Replace Trident
2007 More4: Replace Trident @£20B
2007 More4: Replace Trident 
2007 YouGov: Keep nuclear weapons
2007 Simons Foundation: Keep nuclear
weapons
2009 Guardian: Replace Trident
2009 People Magazine: Spend £20B on
Trident
2009 Independent: Replace Trident
2010 IoS and Sunday Mirror: Replace
Trident
2013 University of York: Replace Trident
@£25B
2013 Public Admin Cttee: Replace
Trident if no cheaper option
Support for Trident replacement by age
0%               20%              40%               60%              80%Poll
2006 Guardian: Replace Trident
2007 More4: Replace Trident 
@£20B
2007 YouGov: Keep nuclear 
weapons
2009 Guardian: Replace Trident
2009 People Magazine: Spend 
£20B on Trident
2009 Independent: Replace 
Trident
2013 University of York: 
Replace Trident@£25B
2013 Public Admin Cttee: Replace 
Trident if no cheaper option
Support for Trident replacement by voting intention
Conservative
Labour
Lib Dem
Youngest (18-24/29/34) 
Oldest (55+/60+/65+)
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0%               20%              40%              60%               80%Position
LDs should go further 
and push for disarmament
LD policy on cheaper 
system is right
LD policy goes too far
None of these
Don’t know
2010 YouGov poll on proposed Liberal Democrat nuclear weapons policy (British adults)
6. Party politics
A number of polls ask specific questions in
relation to party political positions. A 2009 poll
for the Times found that a policy change by the
Brown government to relinquish nuclear
weapons would have marginally strengthened
Labour’s chances of winning the 2010 election,
though nearly half the respondents were
indifferent and thought it would neither
strengthen nor undermine Labour’s chances. 
A 2010 YouGov poll for the Sunday Times
asked respondents about Liberal Democrat
plans for a scaled down nuclear weapon system
to replace Trident. 
8% agreed “The Liberal Democrats should go
further and say they would get rid of all British
nuclear weapons” (2% Conservative, 7% Labour
and 13% Liberal Democrat by voting
intention), 30% agreed “The Liberal Democrat
policy is about right because international
circumstances have changed” (14%
Conservative, 24% Labour, 61% Liberal
Democrat), but 40% agreed “The Liberal
Democrat policy goes too far, and would
endanger Britain's security” (64% Conservative,
52% Labour, 12% Liberal Democrat, even
gender split but 48% 55+ compared to 31% 18-
24), with 18% don't know.
Total
Men
Women
18-24
55+
Con
Lab
LD
Total
Men
Women
18-24
55+
Con
Lab
LD
Total
Men
Women
18-24
55+
Con
Lab
LD
Total
Men
Women
18-24
55+
Con
Lab
LD
Total
Men
Women
18-24
55+
Con
Lab
LD
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Which, if any, of the following issues would
help you to decide how you would
vote at the next election?
A 2013 poll for the University of York
commissioned for this analysis found that only
1 in 8 respondents registered nuclear weapons as
an important issue that would shape their vote
at the next election. This is a higher percentage
than MORI’s longitudinal survey of ‘Most
important issues facing Britain today’ in which
only 1-2% of respondents register nuclear
weapons, but both sets of data indicate that
nuclear weapons are not an important political
issue for the vast majority of the electorate. 
63% of the 1 in 8 that highlighted nuclear
weapons said they would support a party
that opted for nuclear disarmament. Only
9% of Conservative voters registered nuclear
weapons as an electoral issue and of the 63%
of respondents that said they would support
a party that opted for nuclear disarmament,
25% were Conservative voters. Just under
half (48%) of Conservative voters favoured a
like-for-like replacement of Trident when
asked compared to just 23% and 22% for
Labour the Liberal Democrats respectively. 
The low salience of nuclear weapons policy
combined with majority support for not
proceeding with a like-for-like replacement of
the current Trident system arguably gives
current and future governments political space
to make changes to current policy without
incurring loss of public support. It also suggests
an absence of public pressure for policy change.
0%               20%              40%              60%             80%
The economy
Immigration & Asylum
Health
Tax
Employment
Pensions
Crime
Education
Europe
Family life & childcare
The environment
Transport
Afghanistan
Same-sex marriage
Animal rights
Nuclear weapons
None of these
Don’t know
2013 University of York key voter issues (British adults)
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0%               20%              40%               60%    Position
Much more likely
A little more likely
No difference
A little less likely
Much less likely
Don’t know
2013 University of York: respondents that said nuclear weapons were an
issue that would shape their vote by voting intentions (British adults)
Would you be more or less likely to vote for a party that said it would get rid of
nuclear weapons if it won at the next election or would it make no difference?
IPSOS MORI longitudinal survey on key political issues: nuclear weapons
% that state nuclear weapons as an important political issue
Conservative
Labour
Lib Dem
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0
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0%               20%              40%               60%    Poll / position
2010 RUSI
Trident benefits outweigh costs
Trident benefits don’t outweigh costs
Neither agree nor disagree
2010 YouGov Chatham House
Replace Trident
Replace with cheaper
Don’t replace
Don’t know
Expert opinion on Trident replacement
7. Expert opinion
These popular views diverge in some ways from
surveys of the UK’s defence and security elite
associated with Chatham House and the Royal
United Services Institute. Two non-
representative polls of experts for both institutes
in 2010 found a majority for RUSI of those that
think the benefits of Trident outweigh the costs
(53%) compared to those that think the costs
outweigh the benefits (13%) or are evenly
balanced (34%). 
Here, the expert view found more support for
Trident than within the general public. The
Chatham House poll found a minority in favour
of Trident replacement (22%), more in favour of
replacing with a cheaper system (43%) with
29% saying the UK should not replace Trident
at all. This is in line with the three public
opinion polls that introduced a smaller, cheaper
option.
8. Scotland
A final word on Scotland. Scottish public
opinion against the replacement of Trident runs
higher than the UK average. Polls
commissioned by Scottish CND in 2007 and
2013 show clear majorities against replacing
Trident. A 2012 poll for the Scottish National
Party also found 46% in favour of the Scottish
parliament having the power to remove Trident
from Scottish soil with 30% against. Trident has
become a major, some would argue totemic,
issue for the SNP in its campaign for a ‘yes’ vote
in the September 2014 referendum on Scottish
independence. The SNP has vowed to remove
UK nuclear weapons from the Clyde Naval Base
as safely and speedily as possible if it wins the
referendum. Popular opinion against Trident
and Trident replacement is not confined to
those in favour of independence. 
In a 2013 SCND poll 70% of those in favour of
independence were also against Trident
replacement, but 55% of those against
independence or yet to make up their mind
were also against Trident replacement. The
Ashcroft (2013) poll and Public Administration
Select Committee (2013) polls challenge this
trend. When Scottish respondents were asked
whether Trident should be based in Scotland
the Ashcroft poll found 43% agreed, 39% said
no, with 18% not sure. These figures were
reversed when asked whether Trident should
remain in Scotland in the event of
independence: 35% were in favour, 50% against
and 15% didn’t know. The Public
Administration Select Committee poll found
49% of Scots in favour of replacing Trident it no
cheaper alternative were available, compared to
43% against with 8% not sure.
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Scottish independence would create real
problems for the UK government in terms of
Scottish public opinion and Trident. This is
compounded by the challenges of relocating the
Trident ballistic missile and warhead storage
and processing facilities at the Clyde base to a
new location in England or Wales. The 2013
poll for the University of York found only 17%
of respondents supportive of the relocation of
nuclear weapon facilities to a site near them.
43% were opposed with 30% neither supportive
nor opposed.
0%               20%              40%               60%    Poll
British surveys with breakdown for Scotland
2006 Times: Keep nuclear weapons
2007 More4: Replace Trident @£20B
2007 YouGov: Keep nuclear weapons
2009 Independent: Replace Trident
2010 Chatham House: Replace Trident (public)
2010 IoS & Sunday Mirror: Replace Trident
2013 University of York: Keep Trident and replace @ £25B
2013: Public Admin Cttee: Replace Trident if no 
cheaper alternative
Scotland-only surveys
2007 Scottish CND(a): Support Trident in 
Scotland for 50 more years
2007 Scottish CND(b): Support spending 
£50B on Trident replacement
2013 Ashcroft: support UK having nuclear weapons
2013 Ashcroft: keep nukes in Scotland today
2013 Ashcroft: keep nukes in Scotland after 
independence
2013 SCND: Support replacement @£65B 
UK and Scottish support for replacing Trident
UK total responses
Scottish responses
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Ashcroft 2013
UK should have nukes
Yes 
No 
Don’t know
Keep nukes in Scotland today 
Yes 
No 
Don’t know
Keep nukes in independent Scotland  
Yes 
No 
Don’t know
Scottish CND 2013
Replace Trident @ £65B
Yes 
Neither 
No 
Don’t know
Scottish support for UK nuclear weapons and independence (Scottish adults)
For Scottish Independence
Against Scottish Independence
Will not vote
Don't know
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Conclusion
This collection of polls is indicative of trends in
British and Scottish public opinion on nuclear
weapons and the Trident replacement
programme. Public opinion surveys and more
deliberative public opinion research provide a
representative view of the electorate’s
interpretation of complex policy issues.  The
impact of public opinion is nonetheless
subjective. It can be invoked to legitimise a
range of policies as well as providing insight for
policy-makers and a platform for innovation by
policy entrepreneurs. It is worth recalling
opinion polls in the early 1980s when the
current Trident system was procured that
generally found more support against Trident
than in favour but the system was procured
nonetheless without hesitation by the Thatcher
government.54 We should also heed the warning
of the Public Administration Select Committee
that “National opinion research tests have
limitations, however, reflecting the impulsive
reflexes of a cohort affected by contemporary
media coverage”.55
Nevertheless, public opinion would appear to
be gradually shifting away from a like-for-like
replacement of the current Trident system,
especially when the cost of building a new fleet
of ballistic missile submarines is introduced.
Opinion is more evenly split when a third
option of a smaller, cheaper replacement is
presented. There is also a plurality of views on
whether UK nuclear weapons are necessary or
important for UK security, and whether they
make us safer, less safe or make no difference in
terms of the security challenges we face and are
likely to face over the coming decades. Perhaps
the clearest conclusion, though, is that only a
small section of the electorate are likely to allow
the issue of nuclear weapons to influence their
vote in a general election thereby creating
political space for policy innovation. 
54 Poll data from Lawrence Freedman, “Britain an Ex-Nuclear Power?”, International Security, 6: 2, 1981, p. 98: 
*Gallup poll of 1063 adults published in New Society 25 September 1980.
**Marplan poll of 1050 adults for Weekend World TV programme.
***Marplan poll of 733 adults for The Guardian 22 April 1981.
55 House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, Engaging the Public in National Strategy, HC 435
(London: HMSO, 2013), p. 28.
Sept. 1980* Nov. 1980** April 1981***
Oppose Trident 47% 53% 53%
Favour Trident 44% 37% 32%
Don’t know 9% 10% 15%
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BASIC is a small, transatlantic non-profit
organization, working to build confidence in a
shared, sustainable security agenda.  We seek to
test traditional concepts of nuclear deterrence as a
security safeguard, and to bring policy-shapers
together to focus on the collective security
interests of non-proliferation and disarmament.
BASIC works in both nuclear weapon and non-
nuclear weapon states, with a specific expert focus
on the United Kingdom, United States, Europe
and the Middle East.  By bridging political and
geographical divides, creating links between
different perspectives in the nuclear weapons
policy debate, and improving processes of
negotiation and decision-making over nuclear
weapons, we aim to address some of the strategic
challenges posed by the changing global nuclear
landscape.
BASIC is not a conventional advocacy
organization.  Nor is it a traditional think tank.
What distinguishes BASIC from other
organizations is our uniquely non-partisan,
dialogue-based approach. We provide a discreet
forum for constructive engagement between
individuals from different geographical, political
or cultural backgrounds on traditionally sensitive
or complex issues.  
Our aim is to break
through existing
barriers, rather than
reinforce entrenched
thinking; to build
understanding of
different perspectives
and identify
commonalities; to use this to encourage fresh or
alternative approaches; and to feed these findings
back in to existing policy debate.
Our work aims to complement that of policy-
makers, think-tanks, research organizations and
advocacy groups.
For more information please visit our website:
www.basicint.org
BASIC in London
3 Whitehall Court
London SW1A 2EL
Tel: +44 (0) 207 766 3461 / 65
BASIC in Washington
110 Maryland Ave., NE Suite 205
Washington, DC 20002
Tel: +1 (0) 202 546 8055
About BASIC (British American Security Information Council)
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Appendix I: 
Trident Alternatives Study: Terms of Reference
The study will take the form of an 18-month assessment led by the Cabinet Office. The Minister
for the Armed Forces will be consulted on the work plan and will maintain close involvement as the
project progresses.
The scope of the work will be limited to the following questions:
(i) Are there credible alternatives to a submarine-based deterrent?
(ii) Are there credible submarine-based alternatives to the current proposal, e.g. modified Astute
using cruise missiles? 
(iii) Are there alternative nuclear postures, i.e. non-CASD, which could maintain credibility? 
The analysis should make an assessment of how alternatives could be delivered, the feasibility, cost
and industrial implications, level of risk and credibility.
The study will report jointly to the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister.
Appendix 2: 
List of surveys 
Dates Pollster Client Sample
9-13 Sept 2005 MORI Greenpeace 1973 British adults
http://www.ipsos-mori.com/Assets/Docs/Archive/Polls/greenpeace.pdf 
28-29 June 2006 Populus Daily Politics 1003 British adults
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/23_06_06dpolitics_nuclear.pdf 
21-23 June 2006 ICM Guardian 1001 British adults
http://www.icmresearch.com/pdfs/2006_july_guardian_july_poll.pdf 
8-10 Dec 2006 Populus Times 1513 British adults
http://www.populus.co.uk/uploads/download_pdf-101206-The-Times-Political-Attitudes.pdf 
8-10 Jan 2007 YouGov CND 2253 British adults
http://www.cnduk.org/images/stories/resources/globalabolition/nuclear_weapon_convention_yougov_poll_jan07.pdf
26-29 Jan 2007 ICM Scottish CND n/a
http://www.banthebomb.org/newbombs/poll.htm  
21-22 Feb 2007 Populus More4News 1006 British adults
http://www.populus.co.uk/uploads/download_pdf-220207-More-4-News-Nuclear-Deterrent.pdf   
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Dates Pollster Client Sample
26-28 March 2007 YouGov n/a 2042 British adults
http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/today_uk_import/YG-Archives-pol-dTel-DefenceBritainRole-070404.pdf 
26-29 July 2007 Angus Reid Simons Foundation 1000 British adults
http://www.thesimonsfoundation.ca/projects/2007-global-public-opinion-poll-attitudes-towards-nuclear-weapons 
29 Jan-19 Feb 2008 WordPublicOpinion.org n/a 800 British adults
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/dec08/WSI_NucElim_Dec08_quaire.pdf 
9-10 June 2009 Populus Times
http://www.populus.co.uk/uploads/download_pdf-100609-The-Times-2005-Labour-Voters-Poll.pdf 
10-11 July 2009 ICM Guardian 1000 British adults
http://www.icmresearch.com/pdfs/2009_july_guardian_poll.pdf   
21-23 July 2009 YouGov People Magazine 2218 British adults
http://iis.yougov.co.uk/extranets/ygarchives/content/pdf/people%20magazine.pdf 
4-6 Sept 2009 ComRes Independent 1001 British adults
http://www.comres.co.uk/polls/Political_Poll_7_Sept_2009.pdf 
24 June-2 July 2010 YouGov Chatham House 2481 British adults + 877 British ‘opinion formers’
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Europe/0710ch_yougov_survey.pdf
23-24 April 2010 YouGov Sunday Times 1412 British adults
http://iis.yougov.co.uk/extranets/ygarchives/content/pdf/YG-Archives-ST-trackers-24.04.pdf 
23 April 2010 ICM Sunday Telegraph 1080 British adults
http://www.icmresearch.com/pdfs/2010_april_st_camp_poll3.pdf 
14-16 Sept 2010 ComRes Independent on Sunday and Sunday Mirror 2028 British adults
n/a
10-12 Oct 2012 YouGov Scottish National Party 1002 Scottish adults
http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/8nauq46tm7/SNP%20Scottish%20Independenc
e%20Results%20121015.pdf 
16-28 Nov 2012 MORI UNA-UK 1,053 British adults
n/a
20-28 Feb 2013 TNS BRBM Scottish CND 1001 Scottish adults
http://www.tns-bmrb.co.uk/assets-uploaded/documents/nuclear-weapons-scot-independence-poll-13-mar-
2013_1363172540.pdf 
6-8 March 2013 YouGov University of York 3390 British adults
http://www.york.ac.uk/media/politics/documents/research/YouGov%20-%20University%20of%20York%20-
%20nuclear%20weapons%20results%20130311%20RESULTS.pdf
29 April-2 May 2013 YouGov Lord Ashcroft 1236 Scottish adults
http://lordashcroftpolls.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Trident-poll-data-tables.xls
10-24 April 2013 YouGov Public Administration Select Committee
3 surveys on ‘The Nuclear Deterrent’ of 1997, 1903 and 1722 British adults
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmpubadm/435/435.pdf
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